

# PROTEST POLICING IN HONG KONG: MAINTAINING PROFESSIONALISM AND SOLIDARITY IN THE FACE OF RENEWED POLITICAL CHALLENGES

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## SUMMARY

Protest has been a feature of Hong Kong political life since the mid-1950s. The structure of protest policing in Hong Kong should be seen from institutional, organizational, and individual levels. We examine the norms and values, staffing, professionalism, and individual motivation of police officers. Based on a questionnaire and performance data, we seek to understand police behavior in the context of increasing protest in Hong Kong. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

KEY WORDS—protest policing; Hong Kong police; performance; functional, solidarity, and pecuniary preferences

## INTRODUCTION

Protest policing has been an integral part of policing in Hong Kong since the late 1950s. The literature indicates that the structure of protest policing depends on institutional and organizational features of policing and police agencies (Earl and Soule, 2006). We argue that a more complete picture of protest policing should also include the individual motivation of police officers. That is, protest policing is best understood from institutional, organizational, and individual levels. We briefly review the institutional and organizational features of protest policing in Hong Kong, focusing on the relatively neglected field individual police motivation. Our study indicates that individual police performance in all domains, including protest policing, may be understood by examining the functional and solidarity preferences of individual officers and the importance they and their supervisors place on supervision and professionalism (Brehm and Gates, 1999).

## BACKGROUND

Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, is an economically developed city, characterized by a relatively high degree of autonomy from the central government, the rule of law, a low crime rate, a relatively efficient and corruption-free civil service, and an increasingly robust civil society. The Hong Kong Police Force, established in 1844, evolved into a paramilitary force typical of colonial police forces (Lau, 2004) and has had considerable experience of dealing with civil unrest. During the post-World War II colonial era, major unrest occurred in 1956 (Kuo Min Tang (KMT) riots in Hong Kong) and in 1967 and 1968 when civil discontent and cultural revolution-inspired violent riots rocked the territory (Bickers and Yep, 2009). In the post-colonial era, the Hong Kong Police have reported a rapid increase in the number of “public order events” (public meetings and public processions), especially since 2003 (Figure 1). Although official statistics do not capture “protests” among these

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Formerly Jiangsu Professor and Dean, School of Public Administration, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. Lin Tingjin passed away on 18 December 2014 at the age of 38. A young life cut short, he had so much more to contribute.




Figure 1. Source: Hong Kong Police Force, “Public Order Event Statistics” [http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp\\_en/09\\_statistics/poes.html](http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/09_statistics/poes.html) and Hong Kong Council of Social Services, Social Indicators (for 2000–2004).

events, it is likely that the number of protests has increased as well. Thus, protest policing has been an integral feature of policing in Hong Kong for the past 70 years.

The structure of protest policing, from a police-centered perspective, considers institutional features of policing and organizational characteristics of various police agencies (Earl and Soule, 2006) as they confront protest. We review these here for Hong Kong.

### *Institutional characteristics*

At the institutional level, we are interested in the formal rules and rules in practice of the police as they pertain to managing protest. If we start from the assumption that the primary aims of policing are to maintain public order and enforce the law (Bittner, 1967, in Earl and Soule, 2006), then protest policing should focus on these goals. In Hong Kong, these formal goals, stated as “upholding the rule of law and maintaining law and order”, are given paramount importance<sup>1</sup> (Hong Kong Police Force, 2015). In practice, these goals are sometimes tested. During the 79-day 2014 occupation of various parts of Hong Kong by thousands of demonstrators protesting against government proposals for constitutional development in Hong Kong, the government instructed the police to contain the demonstrators and separate the protestors from counter-protesters, but not to “enforce the law” that forbade individuals from occupying roads and public thoroughfares and that required those planning a protest to obtain police approval in advance. The police repeatedly appealed to the protesters to leave the protest sites, but on instructions from the government made no move to arrest them for breaking the law. Only when courts ordered the protestors to leave the sites did the police assist court bailiffs to enforce the court orders. In this case, the institutional norm that the law should be enforced was undermined for political expediency. We understand, then, that the institutions are the formal rules and rules in practice.

Moreover, while police seek to maintain control during protests and demonstrations, they are faced with various ethical dilemmas that can affect citizen trust of the police and the legitimacy of police action (Ku, 2012, 67). In their consideration of procession routes, assembly locations, size of the crowd, and so forth the police need to weigh considerations of national security, public safety, public order, and the rights of individuals to assemble and to protest (Ku, 2012, 13). During protests, the police must consider whether to strictly enforce the law when a breach is observed, which could result in more violence. Should every assault in a confrontation between the public and police and among the public lead to an arrest? In these situations, the police as they seek to maintain control

<sup>1</sup>The Hong Kong Police Force, *Public Order Manual*, is a secret document (Ku, 2012, 78) and unavailable to the authors.

must exercise professional judgment, communal values, and common sense (Ku, 2012, 14). Their action must be seen to be reasonable and appropriate and take into account the human rights and personal autonomy of citizens (Ku, 2012, 67).

### *Organizational features*

Organizational features of specific police agencies focus on issues such as organizational structure, size, and professionalism that help to determine their capacity to manage protest.

The colonial police force as it evolved into a paramilitary organization has been amply staffed, a practice that continues to this day. In 2014, the Police Force consisted of about 33 000 employees, all but about 4000 of whom were uniformed officers. The Hong Kong Police Force is one of the largest metropolitan police forces in the world, similar in size to the Metropolitan Police in London and the New York City Police Department (Hong Kong Police Force, 2015). Accordingly, the Hong Kong Police has reserves that can quickly be deployed to manage public protest.

In 1956, the Police Force established a specialist unit, the Police Tactical Contingent, to handle protest. In 1968, in the wake of serious disturbances in Hong Kong, the Police Tactical Contingent was renamed the Police Tactical Unit (PTU) (Police Report No. 7, 2008). The PTU currently employs more than 1000 officers and “provides an immediate manpower reserve for use in any emergency...[The PTU is] available for internal security, crowd management, anti-crime operations and disaster response duties...The PTU also provides up-to-date instruction and training in internal security and crowd management techniques for a wide cross-section of the Force” (Information Services Department, 2015). The PTU recruits from among all serving police officers and leads protest policing in Hong Kong.

A highly professional police force is characterized by its discipline, training, and meritocratic human resource practices. In all of these areas, the Hong Kong Police Force may be said to be highly professional. Not surprisingly, professionalism is one of the core values of the Hong Kong Police Force (Ku, 2012, 68).

The Force became a professional body, however, only relatively recently when in the 1970s, the government took forceful action to eradicate corruption in the public service. In 1974, the government established the Independent Commission against Corruption with wide powers to investigate and prosecute the corrupt. Dozens of police officers were prosecuted or dismissed as a result (Lethbridge, 1985). The government’s strong support for the work of the Independent Commission against Corruption has resulted in Hong Kong becoming one of the least corrupt places in the world (Transparency International (2015) Corruption Perception Index, 2014).

Although the increasing number of protests and more recent conflicts over political reform have resulted in less satisfaction with the performance of the police (Figure 2), nonetheless, satisfaction with their performance remains relatively high. Moreover, the public remains generally satisfied with the police as a disciplinary force (Figure 3), which may serve as a proxy for the public’s perception of police professionalism. As we shall see in the following sections, individual well-performing police officers and their supervisors highly value supervision, which is an important component of professional policing.

We turn now to an in-depth examination of individual police motivation, attempting to unpack the incentives for well-performing police officers, including those managing protests.

### *Individual motivation*

Research has demonstrated a link between hard-working public sector employees and their preferences, especially the extent to which they enjoy their work and value interacting with co-workers (Brehm and Gates, 1999). In their study of police officers in the USA, Brehm and Gates demonstrate a strong and significant association between hard work (for example, performing well in activities such as protest policing) and functional and solidarity preferences, where functional preferences are defined as a preference for the job due to an interest in the work itself and solidarity preferences are defined as a preference for the job because the worker enjoys working with his/her colleagues. The same study concluded that shirking was associated with pecuniary preferences (a preference for the job because of its salary and benefits), that is, the less-committed, less hard-working officers were those primarily



Figure 2. Source: HKU Public Opinion Poll, “Are you satisfied with the performance of the HK Police Force?” <http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/hkpolice/poll/datatables.html>.




Figure 3. Scale: 0 = very dissatisfied; 100 = very satisfied. “Please rate on a scale of 0-100 your satisfaction with the HK Police Force as a disciplinary force. 0 stands for very dissatisfied, 100 very satisfied, 50 stands neutral.” Source: HKU Public Opinion Poll: <http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/hkpolice/poll/datatablesRating.html>.

motivated by extrinsic rewards such as salary and other material benefits. What, then, motivates police officers who perform well in protest policing—their interest in the job, solidarity with colleagues, or police pay and benefits.

To determine the extent to which these same relationships exist for Hong Kong police officers, we have tested the links between hard work in all domains, including protest policing, and the three preferences identified by Brehm and Gates (1999) among Police Constables (PCs) in Hong Kong. As in the USA study, our findings confirm that hard-working PCs in Hong Kong were those with strong solidarity and functional preferences. Accordingly, we also found that pecuniary preferences, that is, a preference for material rewards, were weakly and sometimes even insignificantly related to hard work among Hong Kong PCs. Given the relatively high salaries of PCs in Hong Kong, we acknowledge that PCs selected into the Force may already have been maximizing pecuniary preferences to some degree.

### Methodology

The study involved administering a questionnaire to a randomly selected sample of PCs drawn from all five land regions of the Hong Kong Police Force. The questionnaire, in Chinese, was distributed to the selected PCs in July–August 2010 through the chain of command by the Police Force and collected by the Force on behalf of the Police College.

The questionnaire was composed of 26 items, based to a large extent on the study of the US police reported in Brehm and Gates (1999)<sup>2</sup> (online Appendix 1). PCs were asked the extent to which they were satisfied with their jobs and the extent to which they agreed with the vision and mission of the Force. Eight additional items sought to measure the extent to which PCs valued variety, professionalism, recognition, and learning and using new skills (functional preferences), while two items asked them to rate the importance of relations with their co-workers and supervisors (solidarity preferences). Four additional items asked them to rate the importance of income, working hours, promotion opportunities, and job security to provide a measure of the extent to which they were motivated by pecuniary preferences. Factor analysis was conducted to determine the coherence of the measures of each preference, which were determined to be highly internally consistent (online Appendix 2).

Police Constables were also asked their opinions on the extent to which they were tightly supervised including how much contact they had with supervisors. These questions related to the finding from the US police study that for a variety of reasons, supervisors were unable to effectively monitor and reward or punish their subordinates within a relatively bureaucratic civil service-type system. Supervisors were over loaded, not on patrol with their subordinates, and unable to use tools such as increments very discriminatingly to reward hard work. We wanted to know whether Hong Kong PCs also perceived relatively weak supervision. We also understand that protest policing requires relatively tight supervision, with supervisors physically present during the protests. We also asked PCs to report on the extent to which they perceived that they worked hard (e.g., did they do more or less work than their colleagues? Were they able to complete all assigned tasks? Did they perceive that they did more than was required and so forth?).

To evaluate PC performance, we collected 3 years of the global ratings on supervisor-completed performance appraisal forms for each consenting PC.<sup>3</sup> We used this as a proxy of PC performance (the extent to which they were hard working) and correlated these ratings with self-reported preferences. In addition, because PCs are routinely informed of their supervisors' ratings as part of the appraisal process, PCs should have a good understanding of how their supervisors perceived that they had performed.

Based on a margin of error of  $\pm 2.8$  per cent, the Police Force Personnel Wing generated a stratified random sample of 1221 PCs. The stratifying variables were the five land regions cross-tabulated with gender, years of service, and types of duty. Directly proportional to the sub-population size of each land region, additional 242 PCs were randomly selected from the five regions as replacements for possible non-responses, for a total of 1463 PCs from the five regions. At the end of the 2-month response period, we obtained 953 valid replies,<sup>4</sup> for a response rate of 78.05 per cent based on an effective sample size of 1221 cases.

Descriptive analysis shows that our PC respondents were overwhelmingly male (93.39%), which somewhat under represented women in the Police Force. Of the questionnaire respondents, 6.61 per cent were female compared with about 13 per cent women employed on Police Salary Scale 1a-31 in 2010.<sup>5</sup> The mean age of the respondents was about 35.5 years, while the average years of service was about 14.8 years (Table 1). That is, our respondents were very experienced officers. Some 65.1 per cent of respondents had attained an educational level of secondary Form 4 or 5. A further 12.0 per cent had completed Form 6, while nearly 17.3 per cent of our respondents were either university graduates (8.1%) or had associate degrees (9.2%). This educational profile reflects the fact that

<sup>2</sup>Brehm and Gates (1999) continue the classic work of Michael Lipsky (2010) *Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* 30th ed. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

<sup>3</sup>Each PC was asked on the questionnaire whether or not he/she agreed that his or her performance data for 2007–2008, 2008–2009, and 2009–2010 could be used in this way for the study. A total of 899 PCs consented to the procedure. For each case where consent was obtained, the Police College matched the performance appraisal data with the questionnaire responses. PCs understood that all of their questionnaire responses and performance appraisal data were provided on the basis of complete anonymity.

<sup>4</sup>We deleted the respondents who were younger than 17 years or older than 40 years.

<sup>5</sup>Civil Service Bureau, *Civil Service Personnel Statistics 2010*, p. 20.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of respondents: age, years of service, and gender

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Age	953	20	56	35.4995	7.978
Years of service	953	0.50	35.67	14.8103	8.749
Gender (male = 1)	953	0	1	0.9339	0.249
<i>N</i>	953				

an increasing number of PCs have entered the Force with university education. In our data, years of service are negatively associated with education levels. In our data, PCs with university or college/associate degrees had 6–7 years of service, while those with secondary education had significantly longer service, about 17 years for the secondary Forms 4–5 group and 30 years for the secondary Forms 1–3 group. One-way analysis of variance shows that the differences among education groups are statistically significant ( $F = 101.721$ , sig. = 0.000) (online Appendix 3) (Table 2).

### Findings

We have organized the findings of our project on individual motivation into several parts. We report first on the distribution of respondents' preferences. Then the ordinary least square was employed to examine the influence of their preferences on their performance first as PCs themselves perceive it and then as their supervisors perceive it in their performance appraisal ratings. (Correlation analysis is not applicable here as correlation analysis only quantifies the relationship between two variables ignoring which is the dependent variable and which is independent).

*Preferences.* Among the three preferences, PCs indicated that solidarity among co-workers was the most important preference for them (82.7%) followed by pecuniary (71.025%) and functional preferences (59.15%), respectively. That is, PCs in Hong Kong report that they get more satisfaction from good relationships with their co-workers and supervisors than from either the remuneration for the job or the job itself. Still, the preliminary analysis also demonstrates that Hong Kong PCs appear to value remuneration more than the job itself. Scores for all three preferences were high, and the differences among the three preferences are significant. Even though the value PCs place on solidarity reflects the importance of team work in policing and the success of the Police Force in building camaraderie, the importance of financial rewards is obviously emphasized by PCs. Indeed, 92.3 per cent of PCs perceived that a "stable income" was important or very important for them (Q3a), a much higher score than for any of their other factors in the questionnaire. The result also indicates that the culture of the Force is likely to have an important impact on the behavior of individual Police officers, who learn from those they work with what is appropriate behavior. Accordingly, PCs learn from their especially more senior colleagues what protest policing behavior is expected and appropriate.

*Supervision.* According to Brehm and Gates (1999), subordinates in the USA, such as PCs, perceived that they had significant autonomy (that is, that they were not tightly supervised). This may have been because supervisors

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of respondents: education and years of service

Highest education level	Frequency	Percent	Years of service
University (=1)	77	8.10	6.5660
College/associate degree (=2)	88	9.20	6.3040
Matriculation (=3)	114	12.0	9.2091
Secondary 4–5 (=4)	620	65.1	17.2867
Secondary 1–3 (=5)	27	2.80	30.0525
Others (=6)	27	2.80	17.5895
Total	953	100.0	14.8103



were overworked or were often absent, while the work (for example, police patrols) was actually being carried out (Tables 3, 4).

Our survey reveals that unlike the US PCs, PCs in Hong Kong perceived that they were relatively tightly supervised (Q7-9). Thus, 56.2 per cent of PC respondents indicated that they had to report everything or nearly everything to their supervisors and only 10.8 per cent perceived that they worked entirely or mostly on their own (Q7). This variation may reflect the variety of their tasks. To another question, 68.1 per cent reported that they were in close contact with their supervisor (Q8), and 63.7 per cent agreed that it was very or relatively easy for their supervisor to see how well they and their peers were performing (Q9). Only 6.8 per cent perceived that it was not easy for supervisors to observe their performance. We speculate that the different results for the US police may reflect

Table 3. The distribution of preferences (%)

Item	Very important	Important	Middle position	Not important	Not important at all
<b>Functional preferences</b>					
Q3c promotion opportunity	13.3	24.3	34.2	18.7	9.5
Q3e variety responsibilities	16.7	45.2	31.1	5.0	2.0
Q3f professional	18.9	37.8	28.3	10.5	4.5
Q3g recognition public	16.9	34.2	32.5	11.9	4.5
Q3h recognition supervisor	21.2	46.5	25.2	5.4	1.7
Q3i recognition co-workers	22.2	50.8	22.4	3.4	1.3
Q3j learn new skills	17.6	42.9	28.5	8.8	2.2
Q3k utilize skills	17.7	47.0	28.9	4.7	1.7
Total	18.0625	41.0875	28.8875	8.55	3.425
<b>Solidarity Preferences</b>					
Q3l good relationship supervisor	30.7	47.9	18.2	2.2	0.9
Q3m good relationship co-worker	39.0	47.7	11.8	1.0	0.4
Total	34.9	47.8	15.0	1.6	0.7
<b>Pecuniary Preferences</b>					
Q3a stable income	57.5	34.8	6.4	0.6	0.7
Q3b working hours	18.2	37.6	33.9	7.0	3.4
Q3d security	22.5	44.6	26.3	4.7	1.9
Q5 training	27.7	41.2	24.9	5.4	0.8
Total	31.475	39.55	22.875	4.425	1.7

Table 4. The distribution of supervision (%)

Perceived supervision	1	2	3	4	5
Q7 need to report to supervisor	15.7	40.5	32.9	7.8	3.0
Q8 contact with supervisor	27.1	41.0	26.1	4.3	1.5
Q9 ease of observing performance	21.5	42.2	29.6	5.6	1.2
Total	21.4	41.2	29.6	5.9	1.9

Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.759$  indicating very good internal consistency.

either time lag (if the study was carried out now in the USA, the results might be more similar to ours), different patrolling methods (on foot in Hong Kong and in patrol cars in the USA), or Hong Kong's colonial legacy that relies on paramilitary policing, which is more tightly controlled. Relatively tighter supervision of subordinates may characterize protest policing in both places, however.

*Explaining the decision to work hard.* According to Brehm and Gates (1999), functional and solidarity preferences are correlated with the decision to work hard in the public sector, and supervision plays a relatively minor role. In our study, we use two measures of hard work: (1) PC's self-evaluation and (2) supervisor's evaluation.

Table 5. The distribution of self-evaluated hard work (%)

Self-reported hard work	1	2	3	4	5
Q12 have accomplished duties	54.1	34.1	10.2	0.9	0.6
Q13 effort beyond required	26.4	50.1	19.6	1.9	2.0
Q14 amount of work	11.5	37.9	48.0	1.8	0.8
Q15 performance result	36.9	40.7	19.9	1.7	0.7
Total	32.3	40.7	24.4	1.6	1.0

Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.633$ . The level of internal consistency is not high but acceptable.

Table 6. The distribution of performance appraisal scores (%)

Performance appraisal score (positive measure)	1	2	3	4	Missing
2007–2008	0.2	9.3	33.3	39.5	17.7
2008–2009	0.1	9.1	35.5	43.3	12.0
2009–2010	0.1	6.9	35.7	49.3	8.0

The performance appraisal scores range from 1 = D, 2 = C, 3 = B, and 4 = A, where the best performers received an A (coded here as 4).

We asked PCs to evaluate the extent to which they have accomplished their assigned duties, put in effort beyond what is required, worked more or less than their peers, and their understanding of the extent to which their supervisor indicated they had over or under performed in their most recent performance appraisal (Q 12–15). Factor evaluation indicates that these questions are coherent and are measuring a single factor. The descriptive data in Table 5 shows that almost 73.0 percent of respondents claimed they were hard working, while only 2.6 per cent evaluated their performance negatively.

For supervisor's evaluation, we used an average of the performance appraisal global ratings for each PC, obtained with the consent of the PCs from the Police Personnel Wing. Table 6 describes the details of the performance appraisal data. Further correlation analysis shows the performance appraisal scores are significantly correlated with PCs' self-reported hard-work scores; Pearson correlation is  $-0.363$ , and it is significant at the 0.000 level; showing the lower self-reported hard-work scores (which means the PC is working harder) is associated with higher performance scores evaluated by the supervisor. Yet the value of this coefficient,  $0.363$ , implies a relatively low internal consistency of the two measures of work performance. This may also demonstrate that PCs and their supervisors perceive PC performance using different standards.

To understand the relationship of the three preferences and the strength of supervision of PC's hard work, we control the impacts of demographic variables, such as age, gender, educational level, and/or length of service, using the ordinary least square regression model.<sup>6</sup> Table 7 reports the results of the dependent variable PC's self-reported performance, while Table 8 reports the results for the supervisor's performance appraisal scores. Because two demographic variables, the years of service and age, are highly correlated (Pearson correlation is  $0.952$ , sig. =  $0.000$ ), there will be a collinearity problem if both are included in the same regression model. Actually, the physical meaning of the two variables is almost indistinguishable, that is, the seniority of PCs. Therefore, models 1 and 3 employ age as the measure of seniority, while models 2 and 4 use the years of service as the same measure. If we compare  $F$  and  $R$  statistics between models 1 and 2, it is more appropriate to interpret the effect of seniority from the perspective of years of service rather than age, while the difference between the two models is not substantial. The same logic applies to the comparison between models 3 and 4. Accordingly, we explore the implications of the two different measures of work performance using only models 2 and 4 (years of service).

Next, we examine the PC's perception of the extent to which they were hard working with the three preferences and supervision. As we see in Table 7 (models 1 and 2), all three preferences (functional, solidarity, and pecuniary)

<sup>6</sup>See online Appendix 3 for a discussion of the impact of the demographic variables.



Table 7. Explaining the decision to work hard: a (dependent variable: self-reported hard-work score)

Model	1				2			
	<i>B</i>	$\beta$	<i>t</i>	Sig.	<i>B</i>	$\beta$	<i>t</i>	Sig.
(Constant)	1.681		15.499	0.000	1.525		17.051	0.000
Functional	0.092	0.167	5.662	0.000	0.094	0.171	5.798	0.000
Solidarity	0.174	0.315	10.895	0.000	0.172	0.313	10.800	0.000
Pecuniary	0.043	0.077	2.774	0.006	0.043	0.077	2.782	0.006
Supervision	0.187	0.256	8.389	0.000	0.186	0.254	8.347	0.000
Gender	0.018	0.008	0.286	0.775	0.014	0.007	0.236	0.814
Age	-0.007	-0.104	-3.115	0.002				
Yrs of service					-0.008	-0.126	-3.622	0.000
Education Level								
University, controlled								
College/associate degree	0.207	0.109	2.832	0.005	0.213	0.112	2.931	0.003
Matriculation	0.121	0.071	1.748	0.081	0.136	0.080	1.971	0.049
Secondary 4-5	0.105	0.091	1.775	0.076	0.133	0.116	2.190	0.029
Secondary 1-3	0.365	0.110	3.233	0.001	0.414	0.125	3.576	0.000
Others	0.198	0.060	1.860	0.063	0.224	0.067	2.089	0.037
<i>F</i>		35.161		0.000		35.595		0.000
<i>R</i>			0.540				0.542	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>			0.291				0.294	
<i>N</i>			953				953	

Table 8. Explaining the decision to work hard: b (dependent variable: supervisor-evaluated performance appraisal score)

Model	3				4			
	<i>B</i>	$\beta$	<i>t</i>	Sig.	<i>B</i>	$\beta$	<i>t</i>	Sig.
(Constant)	3.550		27.081	0.000	3.728		35.041	0.000
Functional	-0.043	-0.083	-2.293	0.022	-0.047	-0.090	-2.488	0.013
Solidarity	-0.036	-0.069	-1.955	0.051	-0.033	-0.064	-1.812	0.070
Pecuniary	-0.007	-0.014	-0.398	0.691	-0.008	-0.015	-0.447	0.655
Supervision	-0.186	-0.266	-7.060	0.000	-0.187	-0.267	-7.123	0.000
Gender	-0.059	-0.028	-0.807	0.420	-0.061	-0.029	-0.842	0.400
Age	0.008	0.115	2.896	0.004				
Yrs of service					0.012	0.172	4.122	0.000
Education level								
University, controlled								
College/associate degree	-0.018	-0.008	-0.183	0.855	-0.034	-0.016	-0.356	0.722
Matriculation	0.164	0.093	1.887	0.060	0.136	0.077	1.560	0.119
Secondary 4-5	0.107	0.092	1.464	0.144	0.050	0.043	0.671	0.502
Secondary 1-3	-0.088	-0.029	-0.664	0.507	-0.193	-0.063	-1.409	0.159
Others	0.045	0.013	0.336	0.737	-0.014	-0.004	-0.107	0.915
<i>F</i>		9.974		0.000		10.859		0.000
<i>R</i>			0.354				0.367	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>			0.125				0.135	
<i>N</i>			778				778	

are positively significant for explaining the decision to work hard to some degree, but the solidarity preference and supervision are the most closely associated with the decision to work hard (Q12-15) followed by functional preferences. The weakest relationship was between pecuniary preferences and hard work. This means that the best performing police officers, as measured by themselves, are motivated by solidarity with their colleagues and by supervision, followed by their interest in the job.

In Table 8 (models 3 and 4), we use supervisor's performance appraisal average global ratings as the measure of performance,<sup>7</sup> which produces a very different outcome. The regression models reveal that performance was more associated with functional preferences than with solidarity. Functional preferences now become the only very significant and substantial predictor of supervisor-evaluated performance (the only preferences that were significant at the 0.05 level), which gives us more confidence in the relationship, while solidarity preferences are also significant at the 0.10 level, and pecuniary preferences statically are no longer significant.<sup>8</sup> This indicates that supervisors believe that the importance PCs' place on financial rewards does not impact their performance, even if PCs believe that more financial rewards will advance their self-reported hard work. This probably implies that supervisors perceive that PCs are not motivated by pay and benefits. The findings enhance our confidence that Hong Kong PCs are less likely to be motivated by pay and benefits than by functional or solidarity factors.

The difference between models 2 (PC self-reported performance) and 4 (supervisor's evaluation of performance) indicates that PCs more highly value solidarity and pecuniary preferences than do their supervisors. The supervisor-evaluated performance is more likely correlated with the perceived importance placed by PCs' on functional and then solidarity preferences and statistically is unrelated to pecuniary preferences. But PCs' self-evaluated performance depends more on solidarity preferences, and then on functional and pecuniary preference, respectively. When PCs decide to work hard, functional, solidarity, and pecuniary preferences will be considered. But the three preferences are not weighted equally. Solidarity preferences will be assigned the highest weight, followed by functional and pecuniary preferences, respectively. This finding indicates that supervisor-evaluated performance emphasizes PC's professionalism, requiring incentives from the importance of the job itself, while Hong Kong PCs care much about their relations with their colleagues. We have seen that professionalism is a key component of the structure of effective protest policing.

Finally, among our explanatory variables, Table 8 shows that supervision has the strongest association with performance as measured by supervisors. That is, the more tightly PCs perceive that they are supervised, the more they perceive that they are working hard. Our findings indicate that the degree of supervision and the extent to which PCs value relationships with their peers and supervisor are the most significant for explaining supervisor-evaluated performance. Even though both PCs and their supervisors agree that the strength of supervision matters in explaining the decision to work hard or supervisor-evaluated performance, the effect of supervision differs from models 2 and 4. In model 4, supervision is the most powerful and significant explanatory variable, followed by functional and solidarity preferences, respectively (supervision > functional > solidarity > pecuniary), while in model 2, solidarity is the most influential explanatory variable (solidarity > supervision > functional > pecuniary). Moreover, the beta coefficients of the four explanatory variables in model 4 show that the difference between supervision and functional preferences is large (0.267 vs. 0.090). This is understandable as the dependent variable in model 4 is supervisor-evaluated performance. We would expect that supervisors are more likely to believe that the strength of supervision matters and this is what we find. The performance highly valued by supervisors can be achieved by increasing the degree of supervision. Yet we note that PC's self-evaluated performance is also significantly and substantially affected by the strength of supervision.<sup>9</sup> We produce Figure 4 by using the beta coefficients from models 2 and 4. The figure vividly shows that both PCs and their supervisors emphasize the importance of supervision, while PCs also highly value solidarity.

Our discussion of the individual motivation of Hong Kong PCs indicates that supervision and a preference for solidarity explain their performance. For PCs, solidarity is more important than supervision, while for their supervisors, supervision is more important. Supervision is a core component of professionalism, one of the organizational attributes of the structure of protest policing. We see, however, police performance is multi-dimensional, and solidarity and functional preferences are also significantly related to performance.

<sup>7</sup>The coefficients of the three preferences and supervision are changed to negative because the current dependent variable, supervisor's performance appraisal score, and independent variables in these models were measured in the opposite directions, while both dependent and independent variables in models 1 and 2 are measured in the same direction.

<sup>8</sup>This is the same result found for police officers in the USA (Brehm and Gates, 1999).

<sup>9</sup>Unlike police in the USA, for whom supervision was found to be almost irrelevant (Brehm and Gates, 1999).




Figure 4. Different effect of preferences on performance between PCs and their supervisors.

### CONCLUSION

We have examined the structure of protest policing in Hong Kong from the perspective of institutional, organizational, and individual levels. At the institutional level, we have seen that the goals of policing in Hong Kong remain upholding the rule of law and maintaining law and order, although in protests, these goals are sometimes tested. Our survey data, focused on individual motivation, indicate that PCs highly value the job of policing, which should support the formal institutional goals of maintaining law and order in Hong Kong. At the organizational level, we note the relatively large size of the Hong Kong Police Force, its degree of specialization, and its commitment to professionalism. Our survey reveals that PCs value supervision and solidarity and that both values are associated with performance. More professional police forces are likely to be relatively tightly supervised and well disciplined. That is, the values of PCs appear to lend support to Hong Kong’s professional police force.

The elements of the structure of protest policing are part of an integrated whole. The police as an institution must be aligned with professional values that individual police officers buy into. Police officers learn from their co-workers what is appropriate behavior. Given the importance of solidarity as a preference, effective protest policing must be built on an ethos of professionalism. Supervision, emphasized by both PCs and supervisors in Hong Kong, plays an important role in transmitting the values of professionalism.

Given the importance of solidarity for Hong Kong PCs in the decision to work hard, effective protest policing should also consider factors that may undermine the unity of the Police Force as it confronts protestors and attempts to maintain or restore order. Maintaining unity may be a challenge when the community is divided over deeply felt issues, as the PCs themselves are embedded in the community. Sending consistent messages through the chain of command can also increase unity, as can strong political support for the work of the police.

The Hong Kong police experience points to the need to ensure that police are adequately compensated (we saw here that remuneration while not the most important factor for explaining performance is nonetheless highly valued by PCs); that given the value police place on solidarity and respect from co-workers, training should focus on developing and popularizing outstanding role models among police officers for PCs to emulate, and police reforms

should focus on enabling the development of professional values and behaviors among PCs to ensure that the institutional mission of the police is achieved.

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### APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE (A CHINESE LANGUAGE VERSION OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS USED FOR THE STUDY)

#### A SURVEY OF JOB SATISFACTION AND PREFERENCES ON HONG KONG POLICE OFFICERS (POLICE CONSTABLES)

##### I) Introduction

This is collaborative research jointly organised by the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Police College, Hong Kong Police Force. The research aims to achieve better understanding of the job preferences of serving police constables, which helps Force management to formulate comprehensive strategies for recruitment and retention. As your input is definitely valuable to the research, please spend 10 to 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire (Part II and III). Your participation in the survey is voluntary and please register your first response relating to each question. You should note that we will retrieve the overall performance rating of your annual appraisal report for the last three years from PICS for comparison on an entirely anonymous basis. All information and data collected will be used for statistical analysis in a global manner (without identifying any officer) and only be processed internally by designated officers of the Research Centre, Hong Kong Police College. Your privacy will be strictly observed and all raw data will be destroyed after the research is completed in December 2010.

# If you do not agree your to appraisal rating to be retrieved, please check the box on the right

Upon completion of this questionnaire, please seal it into the original envelope (address sticker is enclosed) and dispatch it to the Research Centre, Hong Kong Police College within two weeks. Should you have any further query, please feel free to contact Dr. Ernest So, Research Officer at 28602772 or (PEN: ro-rc). Thank you for your assistance!

##### II) Background of Respondent

- A) Years of service in Hong Kong Police Force: \_\_\_\_ (years) \_\_\_\_ (months) (as at 2010-04-30)
- B) Gender: 1.  Male 2.  Female
- C) Age: \_\_\_\_ (years/months)

D) Highest Educational level:

- 1.  University
- 2.  College/Associate Degree
- 3.  Matriculation
- 4.  Form 5
- 5.  Form 3
- 6.  Others (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

III) Questions

Please register your first response relating to each question.		Strongly agree < ----- > Strongly disagree				
1	You find your work fulfilling and usually look forward to going to work.	1	2	3	4	5
2	To what extent do you agree with the vision and mission of the HKPF?	1	2	3	4	5
3	How important is each of the following to you?	Very important < ----- > Not important at all				
	a) I can get stable income from my job	1	2	3	4	5
	b) My job has a reasonable length of working hours	1	2	3	4	5
	c) I have opportunity for promotion in my job	1	2	3	4	5
	d) I feel secure with my job	1	2	3	4	5
	e) I can have a variety of responsibilities in my job	1	2	3	4	5
	f) My job is regarded as professional by others	1	2	3	4	5
	g) I can receive recognition from the public for work accomplished	1	2	3	4	5
	h) I can receive recognition from my supervisor for work accomplished	1	2	3	4	5
	i) I can receive recognition from my co-workers for work accomplished	1	2	3	4	5
	j) I can learn new skills in my job	1	2	3	4	5
	k) I can utilize my skills and talents in my job	1	2	3	4	5
	l) I have a good relationship with my supervisor(s)	1	2	3	4	5
	m) I have a good relationship with my co-workers	1	2	3	4	5
4	To what extent do you think the orders and instructions from the Police Force are sufficient for you to carry out your duties?	1	Very sufficient < ----- > Not sufficient at all			
5	How important do you think job-related training is to your job?	1	Very important < ----- > Not important at all			
6	There is a tendency for supervisors here to give the same performance rating regardless of how well people perform their jobs.	1	Strongly agree < ----- > Strongly disagree			
7	To what extent do you have to report to your direct supervisor?	I have to report everything I do < ----- > I work entirely on my own				
8	How often are you in contact with your supervisor in your daily work?	1	Nearly 100% of the time < ----- > Almost none of the time			
9	In your job, how easy is it for your supervisor to see whether you or your co-workers in the same grade are working well or poorly?	1	Very easy to see < ----- > Not easy at all			
10	How likely do you think your supervisor will take disciplinary action against your defection?	1	Very likely < ----- > Very unlikely			
11	Generally, I do not have enough work to do to keep me busy.	1	Strongly agree < ----- > Strongly disagree			
12	Generally speaking, to what extent do you think you have accomplished your assigned duties?	1	Nearly 100% < ----- > Nearly 0%			
13	How much effort do you put into your job beyond what is required?	1	A lot < ----- > None			

(Continues)

(Continued)

Please register your first response relating to each question.		Strongly agree < ----- > Strongly disagree				
14	Compared to others, how much work do you do?	1	Much more < ----- > Much less			5
15	How did your supervisor evaluate your performance in your most recent performance appraisal?	1	Over-performed < ----- > Under-performed			5

~ End of Questionnaire ~

**APPENDIX 2: FACTOR ANALYSIS**

Factor analysis was conducted to determine the coherence of the measures of each preference. Data show that functional preference was measured by eight items in the questionnaire (Q3c, 3e, 3f, 3g, 3h, 3i, 3j, and 3k). Solidarity preference was measured by two items (Q3l and 3m), and pecuniary preference was measured by four items (Q3a, 3b, 3d, and 5). The three factors combined explain 63.50 per cent of the variance. Accordingly, the factor scores were employed to weight the items of each preference. Reliability analysis finds that Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  for all 14 items is 0.904, implying the cumulative explanatory power of the items is high.

The following table reports the rotated component matrix:

	Component		
	1	2	3
Q3_3a	-0.167	0.435	0.675
Q3_3b	0.242	0.076	0.728
Q3_3c	0.641	-0.015	0.476
Q3_3d	0.326	0.068	0.709
Q3_3e	0.615	0.214	0.200
Q3_3f	0.735	0.191	0.140
Q3_3g	0.805	0.200	0.111
Q3_3h	0.677	0.495	0.153
Q3_3i	0.611	0.570	0.050
Q3_3j	0.745	0.154	0.242
Q3_3k	0.729	0.309	0.173

**APPENDIX 3: CONTROL VARIABLES**

Seniority and gender. The negative coefficient of the years of service in model 2 shows that senior Police Constables (PCs) are more likely to be associated with lower self-reported hard-work scores (indicating better perceived performance), which means they reported their performance as being better than their junior colleagues, others being equal. The same relationship is also found in model 4.<sup>10</sup> That is, both seniors and their supervisors perceive that seniors outperform juniors, other things being equal. All four models confirm that gender does not have any significant effect on performance, regardless of the different measures of performance. This is mainly due to the gender bias within the Police Force (males constitute 93.4% Hong Kong PCs). Education. It is not surprising to find in models 1 and 2 that education level, as an important demographic variable, affects PC self-reported hard-work scores significantly. Compared with PCs with a university degree (the controlled group), other education groups,

<sup>10</sup>Although the coefficient in model 4 becomes positive because of the measure of the dependent variable, as we mentioned previously.



particularly secondary 1–3 and college/associate degree, are more likely to have higher hard-work scores. The finding means that PCs with a university degree are generally more likely to report they were working harder than those without a university degree. Even though university graduates are associated with the best self-reported performance while the worst is observed among PCs with secondary 1–3 education, this does not mean that education level is negatively correlated with the self-reported performance. Actually, PCs with college/associate degrees are placed in the second worst self-evaluated performance, while the matriculation and secondary 4–5 groups seem to fare much better. Because the self-reported hard-work score, as the dependent variable in models 1 and 2, is a subjective measure, logically, it is still unclear whether education levels could predict different performance or just change PCs' attitude to self-evaluation. As the same effects disappeared when supervisor's performance appraisal score was employed as dependent variable in models 3 and 4, the difference between models 2 and 4 (or between models 1 and 3) probably implies that education level just altered PCs' attitude to self-evaluated performance rather than changes their real performance, because the dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is more objective than that of models 1 and 2 (even though the dependent variable of models 3 and 4 is also a subjective measure of performance).